I’m sure that we all remember or know of the Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian war. In 1995, Bosnian Serb forces  of the Republika Srpska under the control of General Ratko Mladic overran the Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica, brushing aside the small UN force sent to protect the area. Then then expelled many refugees from the area, massacring 8000 of the Muslim men and boys in calculated, brutal execution sprees.

Bodies of those killed by Mladic’s forces at Srebrenica.

On Friday the 25th May in the small Syrian town of Houla, shelling started at 12:30 and lasted for two hours, apparently in response to protests. After that, Assad’s Shabiha thugs moved into the town and started to massacre many innocents in a terrible manner, using knives, guns and all manner of weaponry. These killings apparently went on for hours and family-to-family were targeted and killed. Well over 90 people have been left dead. What makes it worse is the fact that 49-32 of the dead were children, and 34 women. The total may be 109 and 300 injured, dead or more.

Bodies of those massacred in Houla, are buried. Note the

similarities.

According to Hadi al-Abdallah, an Al Jazeera journalist, the area had become a hub for the militants of the Free Syrian Army and the government had been unable to enter the town as a result, prompting shelling from a distance.

Even Syria’s greatest ally, Russia, expressed revulsion about the attack. The deputy foreign minister himself while not blaming any side directly, stated that “There are substantial grounds to believe that the majority of those who were killed were either slashed, cut by knives, or executed at point blank distance.” Bassma Kodmani, the head of foreign relations for the Syrian National Council, stated that “Some of the victims were hit by heavy artillery while others, entire families, were massacred.” The Local Co-ordination Committee activist network said that the government thugs shelled the town before “armed militias slaughtered entire families in cold blood” which corroborates other accounts of the shelling and subsequent assault. Horrific.

Of course the Assad fiefdom had to come up with a pathetic response, one official stating that: “Women, children and old men were shot dead. This is not the hallmark of the heroic Syrian army.”

Recently the UN peace envoy Kofi Annan travelled to Syria (after initial reluctance on the part of the Syrian government) to meet with the ever-embattled President and representative of his family Mafia - both a single person - Bashar al-Assad, the man who’s security forces (and they can conclusively be called his security forces under the legal responsibility invested in the President) have been killing peaceful protesters and  for months, spawning the latter to protect the former.

Every single agreement that was supposed to halt the violence has has next-to-no effect on the levels of bloodshed on the part of the security forces. The Arab League peace plan in November 2011 went completely unheeded by the Syrian government and their was still unabated killing in the form of around 250 deaths between the 2nd November (the date of the signing) and the 12th November.  The Arab League Monitoring mission in December 2011 merely delayed the time period in which the security forces would open fire on demonstrations - as soon as the observers were out of sight.

Every single plan proposed has either been rejected by Damascus in the name of the “sovereignty” of Syria, has been paid lip service in the form of meaningless rhetoric, or has been downright ignored. 

Now Mr Annan thinks he may have made a change. He has presented Mr Assad with a series of “concrete proposals” to curb the violence. Meaning that he has done very little that most other international actors have already done or tried to do. Condemn the violence, hand over some proposals (backed by next to no practical action  to ensure that the government enforces them) to the President, shake hands, leave.


Will his “concrete proposals” (which he has yet to elaborate on but will likely be nothing innovative) change anything?

Unlikely. The regime has shown time and time again that the only respect it has is for violence and violent methods of suppression. Notice how Assad was never talking about any kind of negotiated settlement until the armed resistance came about as a reaction to his brutality. On the 30th March he was rambling on about avoiding “subjecting the reform process to momentary conditions, otherwise it will be counterproductive”. The only negotiated settlement that came about (and the only significant development of this kind throughout the entire conflict) was after fierce Free Syrian Army resistance for days on end against  almost impossible odds, and government acceptance that they could not dislodge the fighters for the time being. This is evident from the fact that General Shawkat himself (Assad’s brother-in-law) was reportedly leading the ceasefire negotiations himself. A sure sign that the Assad’s were listening to force and force alone.

Now, after repeated rejections and ignoring of every single peace settlement or plan, Mr Annan believes that he can somehow solve this crisis through negotiation? He even talked of reforms (we all know how swift and progressive Assad’s reforms are) which would create a “solid foundation for a democratic Syria”.

All this bloodshed and some still think that this rotten travesty of hereditary Ba’athism can be reformed? Have around 10,000 deaths not shown the answer to this question? Someone pull Mr Annan out of March 2011.

Talk of “reforms” and leaving Mr Assad with a list of “a set of concrete proposals” to end the violence will get zilch achieved, save an increase in hot air while more innocents are killed. Mr Annan would do better to try to gain better access to weapons for the Free Syrian Army to help them defend these innocents. They can’t fend off the Shabeeeha while hiding behind pieces of paper, can they?

Pieces of paper which will end up down the back of the Assad family sofa, alongside Asma’s credibility and the new “constitution”.


Scores of civilians have been killed since Mr Annan departed with no agreement in his hands whatsoever, because Assad says a solution is impossible as long as the “terrorist groups” continue throughout the country. Read between the propaganda lines and change “terrorist groups” to “the oppositon movement”.


Of course, Assad hopes to sign an agreement with some meaningless opposition sock puppets as soon as he has wiped them out. But if he thinks he can do so then he is extremely deluded. When in history have bullets crushed ideals?

The government only respects violence and will fall by the same road. Not by “concrete proposals” amounting to hot air and no tangible action.

Recently, China has decided to repatriate 31 North Korean refugees (held in various different parts of China) whom have fled from their native land - evidently from economic downturn, hardships in everyday life (relating from an all-pervading lack of food) and repression. Nine may have already been sent back to an uncertain fate.

Despite many pleas from the outside world, China refuses to recognise them as refugees and considers them “illegal economic migrants”, at least officially. This means that they can’t be protected under the 1951 Convention on the Status of refugees. The reason they do this is is partly because of the strong ties that China enjoys with the North Korean regime, and partly because they don’t want to see North Korea collapse and have a unified pro-US South Korea on their doorstep - with the US troop presence that it implies. 

But are any of these concerns genuinely expedient for China’s interests? What does China actually gain from doing this? Are it’s reasons valid?

Firstly, what trade or economic benefit can China reap from relations with the North? The North can barely feed it’s people, sometimes not at all. It is utterly dependent on China for most of the basic commodities it needs to get by. China supplies 90% of energy imports, 80% of consumer goods and 45% of the meagre food that the people so desperately depend on.

But this trade is very one-sided. In 2008, Chinese imports were 2.03 billion, and exports to China from North Korea were valued at less than half that amount, at 750 million. Some say that is from an indirect Chinese subsidy, but it is a strong indication of the dependency North Korea has on China. But if anything. China gets much less out of North Korea than it puts in. Is it worth backing the demagogic, totalitarian state?

Regarding my previous point on China using North Korea as a buffer zone, this could also be argued to be a similarly weak justification for backing the North Korean regime. It is true that any collapse of North Korea (most likely due to an inability to feed enough people, or most people in fact) would probably result in a unified South Korea, backed by the US, on the borders of China. China feels that this would be a threat to China. But this would all too likely not be the case.

The very reason that US troops are stationed in South Korea in the first place is to prevent any invasion by the North - in other words, a repeat of the June 1950 invasion which began the three-year war which cost millions of lives and divided the country in the first place. With Korea unified there would be little threat and the US and South Korean governments would not feel obliged to keep them there. Even if they did (and the US has many military bases throughout the world) then why would this be any economic or military threat to China? The US has nothing to gain from provoking a regional war, or indeed anything to gain from military action of any sort. Neither could an economically prosperous South Korea be a threat - if anything, China could reap serious benefit from such a trading partner. Much more than it could from an impoverished Stalinist dictatorship.

Whatever the many factors may be, it all boils down to the fact that China does not want to see a pro-US, unified Korea on the borders, potentially challenging China’s regional military and economic hegemony (South Korea is very prosperous, a unified Korea could be very much so). China is following a policy of “divide and rule” when it comes to Korea.

But back to these refugees. China gains very little from sending them back, only remaining on warm terms with Pyongyang. Which as we can see, does not bring them much in practical value. All it brings is untold misery and death to those who are lucky enough not to be shot crossing the Tumen and Yalu rivers and escape - only to be sent back to the very same hell hole that most of them are desperate to get away from.

China gains next to nothing in sending them back. It does not have to do so. The North does not dictate what China can and cannot do. China decides that for itself. It would be much more beneficial for China to recognise them for the refugees they are and permit them to be airlifted to South Korea and freedom. Not sent back to repression, hardship and death in their reviled native land. If anything, China’s reputation on the international stage is severely damaged by their complete disregard for the lives of these people. It would be infinitely easier to send them on their way, thus avoiding stains on their already blemished reputation.

It could be argued that by doing so, China loses out by souring the relationship with Pyongyang which regards these refugees as “traitors”. But all Pyongyang could do would be to up the isolationist rhetoric a little, and nothing in terms of practical action. How could it do any more than expostulate when it relies on China for survival? It isn’t wise to offend China in that position, and the Workers Party of Korea and their successive demagogues know it.

Their argument that these people are “illegal economic migrants” is also not justified. Most are not migrating for economic reasons, save some that cross into China to try and raise some money for supplies to their starving families back home. How could you argue with a person merely crossing the border to do that? Their are thousands of refugees in hiding in China, which China argues are illegal and implies they are a drain on the economy. Sending them away then is the definite solution. But doing in the brutal way and sending them back where they came from is not needed. Not at all. They should be sent ON to South Korea as soon as they are found.

Then again, China is probably afraid that too many people fleeing North Korea could cause a collapse of the country, with the aforementioned consequences for Chinese regional interests. This is evident from Chinese actions when famine or food shortages intensify in North Korea. Last March it made the border fence higher, a rather cynical move just when hardship was intensifying. 

China gains little from the relationship with North Korea, and even less from sending back the poor souls fleeing the nightmare in the reclusive state. But it doesn’t have to be this way. China could retain all regional interests and preserve the status quo, while helping the refugees, instead of hindering them and sending them into a recurring nightmare. The sooner they realise this, the better.

According to various sources, Gaddafi’s son Khamis has surfaced once more and been captured near Regdalin and Jmail in Libya, close to the borders of Tunisia. 

He allegedly has an amputated leg and his doctor was captured alongside him. 

This is somewhat confusing. This man has at least five lives. 

• He was reported to have died when a Kamikaze pilot crashed his plane into Gaddafi’s compound around the 13th March. Libyan state TV then showed footage of him greeting regime supporters on a vehicle on the 29th March. 
• He was then reported to have died on the 5th August in an airstrike on the town of Zlitan. Then he turned up again on state TV speaking to a woman allegedly injured in a NATO airstrike. 
• On the 22nd August 2011, CNN reported that a body found in Tripoli may have been the body of Khamis. This proved to be an unsubstantiated claim. 
• He seemed to have used up all his lives on the 29th August 2011. His Toyota land cruiser was reportedly attacked by an Apache helicopter and destroyed. Two days later the Guardian interviewed a captured former bodyguard of Khamis. Abdul Salam Taher al-Fargi, 17, reported that “I was in the truck behind him…when his car was hit. He was burned.” All the other bodyguards captured told the same story, and thus is gained much credibility and was taken to be true. At first, the pro-Gaddafi al-Rai TV based in Syria denied the report. The NTC claimed it was certain he had been killed near Tripoli and buried in Bani Walid. One witness said he saw a weeping Saif attend the funeral. This story looked unequivocally to be true when al-Rai confirmed that Khamis had died on the 29th August, in an announcement on the 15th October. 

There were rumours (via an NTC official) that Gaddafi’s other son Saif told his captures (after his capture on November 15th) that his brother was hiding in Tarhouna. However no evidence was provided for this and it was soon forgotten in the aftermath of the demise of Gaddafi.

However, this recent news is curious to say the least. Khamis’ burned-out vehicle was seen, Jeremy Bowen’s notebook that the journalist lost and somehow got into Khamis’ hands, which was then used for jotting down military plans in for the defence of the regime, the testimony of the guards, etc. All the evidence points to his demise.  

Yet, if he is still alive, what could have (hypothetically) happened instead? Could the NTC have known he was still alive (hence the testimony of the NTC official) yet not wanted to release the information for the sake of PR (embarrassing to have one of Gaddafi’s sons on the loose and admit you cannot find him), could the bodyguards and others have lied and let their leader escape out of loyalty, or did he escape severely wounded.  

Saif Gaddafi suffered fairly serious injury as a result of a similar NATO strike on his convoy and yet escaped for a few more weeks. Could Khamis have gone one better and lost his leg, yet have gone on to live to die another day (or another few times)? 

Who knows? This may all be rumour and hearsay. But keep an open mind. For all we know, the former commander of the 32nd Brigade and late Libyan dictator’s son is still alive, and maybe with a few more tricks - or lives - up his sleeves.

Over the last week, the Syrian government has subjugated the embattled city of Homs to a furious bombardment with hundreds of rockets and mortars since the 3rd February and is currently ongoing. It has toppled houses, caused residents to scramble for their lives, and killed anything from around 55 to 416 civilians, with five Free Syrian Army soldiers killed. 

According to the Telegraph, an activist names Abu Abdul al-Homsi gave an eyewitness account. It follows: “We can’t count all the bodies from the streets and the collapsed buildings. Anyone who tries to go on the street might be killed - there are snipers,” said Abu Abdu al-Homsi, spokesman for the Syrian Revolutionary Council, an opposition group, in Homs. “An old woman - her son was shot and killed in the street, she went to get his body and was shot dead too.” 

I have heard numerous stories telling of exactly the same thing, and seen footage corroborating the claims. The wounded and injured all show signs of sniper wounds, or wounds sustained from horrific explosions. Some videos are too graphic to link to. 

This has been dubbed the “fiercest attack yet” on the besieged, divided city.  Deaths in these numbers have seldom occurred on any other day in Syria, save for the Ramadan Massacre in Hama in late July/early August, killing over 200 people by the end of the latter. 

What does this tell us? Shall we look at the evidence? 

The last time an operation of this scale was mounted was when the city had totally fallen out of government control back in July. In that instance, as many as half a million people flooded the streets of the city to demand the fall of the Assad regime. The government clearly panicked, and wanted to crush this before the Euphoria got any larger. 

This bombardment has come at a time in which the Assad regime is clearly on the defensive. They have lost Zabadani (and are currently trying to reclaim it), they previously lost control of parts of the capital itself and had to engage in heavy fighting to drive them out, and around 2/3 of Homs has fallen out of the control of the government. 

These are similarly desperate times, as they were in July/August. The only difference is the levels of armed resistance have drastically risen by at least 99% in all parts of Syria since the uprising began.  

In Hama in July/August, 8 policemen were killed during the Ramadan massacre. Now the toll is up to about 67 of the security forces in the Hama area. In Homs, casualties amongst the security forces have risen from about 12 to more than 859 since March. This figure was compiled in January and is all too likely to be vastly outdated by now, if we are to believe the allegation that 4-5 are being killed each day. 

The government does not respect anything but force, as I have mentioned repeatedly. Hence it simply acts on instinct and cannot do anything else. What can a regime which respects nothing but force do when guerrilla fighters hold swathes of territory and cannot be rooted out due to the support of the local populace? How can they reach a negotiated settlement by dispersing protesters with bullets? 

They are stumped, but do not know what to do. They do not see that every bullet fired, every civilian killed, every atrocity committed - only makes their demise more imminent. It just pushes the Syrian people out of the Assad’s carefully crafted national climate of fear - from which it is already impossible for them to return to. It is now not a matter of IF the regime falls, but when. 

Sadly, all these acts of desperate violence come with heavy civilian casualties as a consequence of the dictatorial, brutal ignorance of the Assad entourage. But the sacrifice is not in vain. The opposition has an iron resolve and a brave and resilient armed wing which has seemingly significantly degraded the combat capabilities of Assad’s forces. 

In the words of some Benghazi graffiti from the early days of the Libyan revolution: “We Have Broken The Fear Barrier, We Won’t Retreat.”